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A Fighting Chance: The Proposed
Servicemembers Access to Justice Act
& Its Potential Effects on Binding
Arbitration Agreements
Sean M. Hardy*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the first decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close, the
United States Armed Forces remain embroiled in conflicts overseas, as part
of its overall War on Terrorism.' As fighting in Iraq draws down, the focus
has shifted to the conflict in Afghanistan.2 This period of continuous battle,
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is the longest ever
faced by the Armed Forces since the creation of an all-volunteer military in
1973. 3 Moreover, in the absence of compulsory conscription, the military
" B.A., University of Southern California, 2006; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 2009. 1
would like to dedicate this article to E. Michael Hardy, U.S. Army (ret.), David E. Hardy, U.S. Air
Force (ret.), Jason Hardy, U.S. Army, and Stephen Neil Hyland, U.S. Army.
1. See Peter Baker, With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2009, at A6. In a nationally televised address on February 26, 2009, President Barack
Obama outlined a plan for a phased withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq, taking place over an
eighteen month period. See id The President stated that, "By August 31, 2010, our combat mission
in Iraq will end." Id. See also Campbell Robertson, New Rules in Iraq Add Police Work to Troops'
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A5.
2. See Helene Cooper, Putting Stamp of Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at Al. In a move that nearly doubled the number of American soldiers there,
President Obama ordered that 17,000 troops be sent to Afghanistan. See id. Citing the
"deteriorating situation" in the country, the President fulfilled the wishes of American commanders
who had requested additional forces to combat the resurgent Taliban. Id See also Elisabeth
Bumiller, Major Push Is Needed to Save Afghanistan, General Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at
A7; Michael P. Gordon & Thorn Shanker, Plan Would Shift Forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at A14.
3. See Thorn Shanker, Army Is Worried by Rising Stress of Return Tours to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/washington/06military.html. The
length of these wars has led to extended deployments and numerous tours of duty, which have taken
their toll on Armed Services members. See id. "Among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or
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has relied to an extraordinary degree on its Reserves and the National Guard
to bolster its battlefield ranks.4 These servicemen and women have faced
repeated deployments of up to fifteen months, although Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates has taken steps to shorten such disruptive tours of duty.5
Such extended stays can cause severe disruption in the civilian lives of
these part-time soldiers.6 More than 400,000 National Guard and Reserves
were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan between September 11, 2001, and
November 20, 2007.7 These men and women come home, often with
debilitating injuries or mental disorders, and return to work.8 In some
instances, their employers may be unsympathetic to their wartime
experiences, and downgrade or terminate their employment.9 In anticipation
fourth time, more than one in four show signs of anxiety, depression or acute stress, according to an
official Army survey of soldiers' mental health." Id.
4. See generally MICHAEL WATERHOUSE & JOANNE O'BRYANT, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report No. RS22451, NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL AND DEPLOYMENTS: FACT
SHEET (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS2245I.pdf. As of January
2, 2008, the combined National Guard and Reserves compose twenty-one percent of the U.S. forces
in Afghanistan and eleven percent of the forces in Iraq. See id. at CRS-4.
5. See William H. McMichael, Gates Details Plans for Deployment, Dwell Time, MARINE
CORPS TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, available at
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/0l/militarygatesO12709w/. In early 2009,
Secretary Gates announced a new plan in which Army troops will serve for one year abroad
followed by one year back home before any additional deployments may occur. See id This rest
period may prove crucial; for Gates noted that while the Iraq War is "winding down ... there may
be hard days ahead for our troops." Id. See also Shanker, supra note 3.
6. See Bob Deans, U.S. Reserves Dangerously Overtaxed by Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Panel Says, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.coxwashington.com/hp/content/reporters/stories/2008/02/O1/GUARDGAO ICOX.html
. Whereas the Reserves were sarcastically referred to as "weekend warriors" during the Cold War
era, and rarely saw actual service overseas, today they are continuously called on to fill crucial gaps
in the slimmed-down post-Cold War military. Id. According to Thomas Welke, deputy director of
operations at Fort McPherson, "This is the longest period of sustained mobilizations of this high
tempo since the Army Reserves was founded one hundred years ago[.]" Id.
7. See WATERHOUSE & O'BRYANT, supra note 4, at CRS-5.
8. See Marilyn Elias, Iraq War Takes Unique Toll on National Guard, USA TODAY, Aug. 20,
2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-08-20-posttraumatic-stressN.htm.
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research studies indicate that National Guard members are six times
more likely than active duty servicemembers to suffer from mental illness, induced by financial
difficulties resulting from their deployments. See id. As one researcher puts it, "[National Guard
members] haven't trained as much before going over, their spouses may be more anxious than
active-duty military and find it harder to get support in their neighborhoods.... There's also the
potential for financial difficulties." Id.
9. See Stacey Stowe, After Uniform, White-Collar Blues; Reservists Find Careers Have Been
Downsized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ftillpage.html?res=9BO7E6DAI E3FF93BA I 5753C I A9639C8B63.
According to Air Force Major Robert Palmer, in 2004 alone the Department of Defense "handled
6,242 cases involving claims of job discrimination, job placement or inadequate pay or
330
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of such shabby treatment of returning veterans, Congress enacted the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights of 1994
(USERRA).'0 The USERRA, among other things, provides extremely
generous reemployment rights to plaintiffs who have been fired because of
their military service, and grants jurisdiction over such cases to the United
States District Courts.1" However, the law was silent on the effect of
arbitration provisions in employment contracts.
This ambiguity has been interpreted by two United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals as permitting such arbitration agreements, thereby denying many
military plaintiffs access to the federal courts. 12 These courts relied on a line
of Supreme Court cases involving the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that
makes clear the Court's strong pro-arbitration stance. 3 Yet, such a
construction stands at odds with another line of high court cases involving
veterans' employment laws, as well as the Congressional intent behind the
USERRA.14  To rectify this incongruity, in August 2008 a bill was
vacation . I..." d. Such employment issues occur even if the reservist is a professional, such as a
stock broker or an attorney. See id.
10. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (2009). See generally Konrad S. Lee, "'When Johnny Comes
Marching Home Again" Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 247 (2008), for an
excellent overview of the USERRA and its renewed importance due to the increased use of part-time
military personnel in the War on Terror.
11. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4316(c), 4316(b)(1), 4323(b)(3) (2008).
12. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2008); Garrett v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006). Numerous commentators have criticized the
increased use of pre-dispute employment agreements mandating binding arbitration. See Russell D.
Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 291 (2002)
("Increasingly, working Americans face the choice of accepting a mandatory arbitration clause in
their employment agreements of having no employment at all."). Such commentators often praise
arbitration as useful in commercial and labor disputes, but deem mandatory arbitration provisions in
employment contracts as contracts of adhesion "that often amount to a non-negotiable requirement
that prospective employees relinquish their rights to redress in a court of law." Id. These critics
point to the one-sided nature of such contracts, in which employees often do not understand what
they are signing and the employer has the opportunity to select an arbitrator who may be, subtly or
glaringly, biased in favor of the employer. See Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:
Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1649-50 (2005). See also Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 99, 146-152 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court "reached a
high water mark of statutory misinterpretation" when it upheld the arbitrability of employment
contracts).
13. See Garrett, 449 F.3d at 674 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991)).
14. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946), cited in
Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 583 (1977) and King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S.
215, 221 (1991).
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introduced in the United States Senate that clearly states USERRA claims
supersede any preexisting arbitration clauses in employment agreements. 15
This bill, known as the Servicemembers Access to Justice Act (SAJA),
would restore full access to the federal court system for USERRA
plaintiffs. 16
This paper examines the SAJA and its potential effects on the USERRA.
It begins with a survey of the history behind the passage of the USERRA, as
well as the FAA. Next, it describes the two federal circuit court decisions
that have led to the proposal of the SAJA. A further section explores the
SAJA itself. A commentary section follows, expressing disagreement with
the court decisions and support for the SAJA, as it restores the privileged
status bestowed upon veterans by Congress in the USERRA and its
predecessor statutes. Finally, the conclusion looks forward to the passage of
this much needed law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The FAA
In the early Twentieth Century, the use of arbitration to resolve legal
disputes was often viewed with a jaundiced eye by American courts.' 7 This
widespread institutional hostility led to the passage of the FAA in 1925.8 In
no uncertain terms, the FAA states that written arbitration agreements are
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."19 Beginning in the 1980s,
the United States Supreme Court began a line of cases that greatly enhanced
the force of agreements to arbitrate under the FAA. In the 1985 case
Southland Corp. v. Keating,2 ° the Court held that, under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, the FAA superseded any state laws barring the
15. See S. 3432, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008).
16. See S. 3432, 110th Cong. §§ 1-3 (2008).
17. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). Julius Cohen, the principal author of the
FAA, articulated in a brief to Congress that:
For many centuries there has been established a rule, rooted originally in the jealousy of
courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by their agreement, oust the
jurisdiction of the courts. This rule was so firmly established that our American courts
did not feel themselves free to change the rule ....
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J.
Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16, 39 (1924) (statement of Julius Cohen).
18. See9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2009); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
20. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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use of arbitration in contracts drafted under state law. 2' The following year,
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,2 the Court
upheld the arbitration of statutory claims, reasoning that such agreements do
not entail the abdication of substantive rights, but rather the submission to an
alternative forum for dispute resolution.23  The Mitsubishi Court also
articulated that "if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by
a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history. 24
The Court expanded upon Mitsubishi in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp,25 where the plaintiff had sued his employer under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and was made to enter
arbitration pursuant to a prior agreement.2 6 The Court reaffirmed the
principle that statutory claims are arbitrable under the FAA, unless the party
seeking to avoid arbitration could show that Congress had intended to
preclude the waiver of a judicial forum for that particular statute.27
In recent years, the Court's pro-arbitration stance has continued
unabated. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,28 it upheld the practice of
employers requiring employees to arbitrate all employment discrimination
claims.29 Most recently, in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,3° the
Court denied parties the ability to contract to additional grounds for judicial
review of arbitral awards beyond the extremely narrow terms outlined in the
text of the FAA.3' It is this favorable attitude toward arbitration agreements,
by both the Supreme Court and the FAA itself, which has largely been used
to justify the arbitration of USERRA claims.32
21. See id. at 16-17.
22. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
23. See id. at 628.
24. Id.
25. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
26. See id. at 23-24.
27. See id. at 25-26.
28. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
29. See id. at 123-24.
30. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (U.S. 2008).
31. See id. at 1406-08.
32. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2008); Garrett v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 674-76 (5th Cir. 2006).
333
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B. The USERRA
In the modem era, the United States has consistently passed legislation
to help ensure the fair treatment of its returning service men and women, in
large part to exorcise the grim specter of the Bonus March of 1932, wherein
an army of unemployed World War I veterans was savagely beaten and
broken up by the government.33 Congress passed the USERRA in 1994, in
the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.34 The act was essentially a
substantial redrafting of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance
Act of 1974, popularly known as the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act
(VRRA).35 The VRRA, in turn, was based on the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940.36
According to its text, the USERRA is meant:
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or
minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from
such service; (2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing service in
the uniformed services as well as to their employers, their fellow employees, and their
communities, by providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons upon their
completion of such service; and (3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of
their service in the uniformed services.
In order to vindicate these rights, a USERRA plaintiff may avail
themselves to two options. 38 First, the plaintiff may file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor for referral to the Attorney General for prosecution. 39
Second, the plaintiff may directly file a civil action.4 0  The USERRA
expressly grants jurisdiction over claims against private employers to the
33. See Lee, supra note 10, at 252-54 (summarizing the history of veterans' reemployment
rights). The Bonus March occurred when veterans of the First World War descended on
Washington, D.C. in an attempt to force Congress to pass legislation allowing for the immediate
redemption of bonds issued to them in 1924, but which were irredeemable until 1945. See generally
PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN AMERICAN EPIC (2004). President
Herbert Hoover, distressed by the constant presence of over ten thousand disheveled veterans
camping on the National Mall, ordered Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to drive them out.
See id. at 228-31. The veterans were forcibly removed by Army troops wielding rifles, machine
guns, pistols, and riding in tanks. See id. This horrific spectacle shocked the nation, and led to a
surge of veterans' benefits legislation, so that by 1943, over 243 such bills were pending before
Congress. See id. at 269.
34. See 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2008).
35. See Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2004) (providing an
extensive survey of the USERRA's predecessor statutes).
36. See id. at 765-67.
37. § 4301.
38. See §§ 4322-4323.
39. See § 4323(a)(1).
40. See § 4323(a)(2).
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United States District Courts, whether brought by individuals or by the
United States on their behalf.41 Available remedies include equitable relief,
lost wages and benefits, and, if the employer is willfully noncompliant,
liquidated damages equivalent to any award for lost wages and benefits.42
Courts also have discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and court
costs to successful plaintiffs.
43
The USERRA establishes broad protections for veterans and those that
aid them in their claims. Section 4311(a) of the USERRA prohibits an
employer from denying a servicemember retention in their job on the basis
of their military service.4  Section 4302(a) provides that the USERRA is
only the baseline for reemployment rights, and does not prevent the states
from enacting more sweeping protections.45 However, the USERRA also
makes clear that it trumps any state law, contract, or other device that
reduces the rights guaranteed by the USERRA.46 Of most relevance to this
paper is § 4302(b) of the USERRA, which provides that the statute:
supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement,
policy, plan, practice or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any
right or benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of additional
prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.
4 7
One commentator has noted that the USERRA is "unique among anti-
discrimination statutes and strongly favors the USERRA plaintiff.' '  For
instance, the threshold for the USERRA plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case is extremely low, and, once established, both the burden of persuasion
and the burden of production shift to the defendant.49
The legislative history behind the USERRA lends credence to the
contention that any ambiguities within its text are to be construed in favor of
the plaintiff service member. Specifically, the House Committee Report
states that § 4302(b) provides a general preemption against conflicting state
laws or employment agreements that reduce the rights protected by the
41. See § 4323(b)(1).
42. See § 4323(d)-(e).
43. See § 4323(h)(2).
44. See § 4302(a).
45. See § 4302(a).
46. See § 4302(b).
47. § 4302(b).
48. Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers, and
the Law, 19 HEALTH LAW. 1, 9 (2007).
49. See id
335
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USERRA. 50 The Report goes on to state that if a person protected by the
USERRA enters arbitration, "any arbitration decision shall not be binding as
a matter of law., 51 The House Committee notes that while a USERRA
plaintiff may waive those rights already in existence, such a waiver must be
"clear, convincing, specific, unequivocal, and not under duress.' ,52
Moreover, the Report wams that "an express waiver of future statutory
rights, such as one that an employer might wish to require as a condition of
employment, would be contrary to the public policy embodied in the
Committee bill and would be void.,
53
The increased deployment of Reserve National Guard units to Iraq and
Afghanistan has led to an urgent need for straightforward explanations on
the workings of USERRA for both protected employees and their employers.
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2006 alone, 16,000 formal and informal
USERRA claims were reported. 54 On January 18, 2006, the Department of
Labor, after collaboration with the Department of Defense, issued its final
Regulations interpreting USERRA for civilian employers of service
members.55 In their preamble, the Regulations cite Supreme Court precedent
that calls for the liberal construction for veterans' reemployment laws.56 The
Regulations go on to presage "that this interpretive maxim shall apply with
full force and effect in construing USERRA and these regulations. 5 7
C. Supreme Court Precedent Dealing with Veterans Employment
Legislation
As noted previously, the USERRA is a successor statute to the VRRA
and the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940.58 The Supreme Court
has a history of construing such statutes in favor of the veteran plaintiff. For
instance, in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 9 the Court
considered the intent behind the Selective Training and Service Act.6 °
50. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-65(I) (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2453.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Military Personnel, Additional
Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Reserve Employment Issues, GAO-07-259 at 2(2007)
[hereinafter GAO Report].
55. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 1002.1-1002.314 (2006).
56. See 70 Fed. Reg. 75246 (2005).
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
59. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
60. See id. at 280-84.
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Concerning the purpose of the Act, the Court determined that "[the veteran]
who was called to the colors was not to be penalized on his return by reason
of his absence from his civilian job. He was, moreover, to gain by his
service for his country an advantage which the law withheld from those who
stayed behind., 61  The Fishgold Court stated it would apply a liberal
construction of the statute, in favor of the veteran.62 Indeed, rather than view
each section of the Act in isolation, the Court would "construe the separate
provisions of the Act as parts of an organic whole and give each as liberal a
construction for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the
separate provisions permits. 63 In reaching its conclusion, the Court gleaned
Congressional intent from the legislative history.
64
The Court has continued to apply the Fishgold maxim of liberal
construction when dealing with veterans' re-employment statutes. Decades
later, in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis,65 the Supreme Court was tasked with
interpreting the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, the successor statute
to the 1940 law.66 The Court found that Congress intended to make
veterans' return to civilian life as seamless as possible by guaranteeing them
the same jobs they had held prior to their call to service.67 Again, the Court
stated that such statutes were to be liberally construed to the veteran's
benefit.68
In King v. St. Vincent's Hospital,69 the issue was whether a provision of
the VRRA implicitly limited the length of military service which guaranteed
the service member a right to their civilian employment.70 The Court was
able to reach a conclusion in the veteran's favor based on the text of the
VRRA. 71 However, the Court noted that even if the statute had not been
61. 1d.at284.
62. See id. at 285.
63. Id. Considering the case was decided in 1946, in the wake of the Second World War, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Court should employ an analysis so deferential to the veteran. See id.
at 275. Fishgold was thus the genesis of the interpretative maxim mentioned in the preamble to the
final regulations interpreting the USERRA. See 70 Fed. Reg. 75246.
64. See Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 289-90.
65. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
66. See id at 583-84.
67. See id. at 583.
68. See id. at 584. Although the plaintiff in Davis was a World War II veteran, this case was
crucial in continuing Fishgold's interpretive maxim into the Vietnam era. See id. at 582.
69. 502U.S.215(1991).
70. See id. at 216.
71. Seeid. at220-21.
337
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clear, "we would ultimately read the provision in [the veteran's] favor under
the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are
to be construed in the beneficiaries' favor., 72 From the Second World War
until the present day, the United States Supreme Court has read veterans'
reemployment rights statutes in the light most favorable to the veteran.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FAA AND THE USERRA
A. Garret v. Circuit City Stores
The question over the interplay between the USERRA and the FAA has
wormed its way through the court system in recent years. There has been no
consensus at the district court level, with several district courts finding that
mandatory arbitration provisions in employment agreements may not be
enforced as to USERRA claims, and other courts finding the opposite.73 In
Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,74 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to address whether
USERRA precludes the enforcement of individual arbitration agreements.75
Garrett, a marine reservist, had been employed by Circuit City since 1994.76
In 1995, "Circuit City adopted its 'Associate Issue Resolution Program,' a
company-wide procedure for resolving employment disputes., 77  The
program would resolve termination disputes through final and binding
arbitration, enforceable through the FAA.78  Garrett sent written
acknowledgment of his receipt of an information packet on the program, and
72. Id. at 221 n.9 (citing Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285
(1946)). Notably, the Court articulated that it presumed when Congress passed the veteran's statute,
it was aware of the Fishgold interpretive maxim. Id. (citing McNary v. Haitain Refugee Center, Inc.,
498 U.S. 479, 498 (1991)). There is little doubt that the Court would likewise hold similarly
concerning the congressional intent behind the USERRA.
73. See Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding
USERRA preempted the employment contract at issue, and that the waiver of plaintiffs right to a
judicial forum was unenforceable because said waiver was not "clear, convincing, specific and
unequivocal"); Lopez v. Dillard's, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that the
arbitration agreement was an impermissible additional prerequisite to plaintiff's exercise of
USERRA rights); but see Kitts v. Menards, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (holding
USERRA claims are arbitrable).
74. 449 F.3d 672 (2006).
75. See id. at 673.
76. See id. at 674.
77. Id.
78. See id.
338
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did not opt out of the arbitration provision within the thirty-day timeframe
he was apportioned.79
Between December 2002 and March 2003, as the United States was
preparing for operations in Iraq, Garrett claimed he had been subjected to
undue criticism from his supervisors.80 Garrett's employment with Circuit
City was terminated in March 2003, the same month the Iraq War began,
and he alleged this firing was solely because of his military reservist status.
81
He sued Circuit City under the USERRA in federal court, and Circuit City
moved to compel arbitration, as per its agreement with Garrett.82 Garrett
argued that § 4302(b) of the USERRA prevented any enforcement of such
an arbitration provision because the USERRA supersedes any conflicting
law or contract that limits the rights or benefits guaranteed by the
USERRA.83 Specifically, Garrett contended that a service member's right to
sue in federal court was a "right or benefit provided by" the USERRA.84
The district court agreed, and denied Circuit City's motion to compel
arbitration.85 Circuit City appealed the court's order to the Fifth Circuit.
86
The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Edith Jones, reversed the
district court, and held that USERRA claims are subject to arbitration under
the FAA.87 In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court relied primarily on
the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence and its attendant pro-arbitration
stance.88 It placed the burden on Garrett to demonstrate Congressional intent
to preclude the arbitration of USERRA claims. 89 The Fifth Circuit Court
was unconvinced.90 Applying a textualist approach, the court determined
that because the language of the statute did not limit jurisdiction exclusively
to the district courts, there was no intent to prohibit an arbitral forum.9' The
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id at 676.
85. See id. at 674.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 673,
88. See id. at 674-76.
89. Id. at 674 (Under Gilmer, "Garrett bears the burden to prove that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for USERRA claims.").
90. See id. at 678-79.
91. See id ("Congress took no specific steps in USERRA, beyond creating and protecting
substantive rights, that could preclude arbitration.").
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court distinguished substantive and procedural rights and determined that
access to a judicial forum was not a substantive right protected by the
USERRA.92 Rather, it found that the agreement to arbitrate was merely a
forum selection clause because the enumerated substantive rights guaranteed
by the USERRA are enforceable through arbitration.93 To support its
reasoning, the court likened USERRA to other antidiscrimination statutes,
such as those designed to protect the elderly.94
In keeping with its textualist analysis, the court gave short shrift to
Garrett's argument that the legislative history of the USERRA supports the
view that Congress intended to prohibit binding arbitration. 95 It dismissed a
section of the House Committee Report directly addressing arbitration as a
"snippet of legislative history" not binding to the court's decision.9 6 The
court determined that Congress meant only to preclude the limiting of
USERRA's substantive rights through collective bargaining agreements.97
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between collective bargaining
arbitration agreements, which are not subject to arbitration, and
"individually executed pre-dispute arbitration agreements," which are
subject to arbitration.98 Thus, the court determined that there was no barrier
to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement between individual
employees and their employer. 99
The Fifth Circuit found no inherent conflict between arbitration and the
USERRA because the arbitrator would be "bound to apply the applicable
law" and allow for certain procedural safeguards.'00 The court was not
convinced that Garrett had shown an arbitrator would deny him a fair
opportunity to present his claims.'0 ' Finally, it rejected Garrett's public
policy argument that allowing for arbitration would go against USERRA's
purpose of protecting soldiers and, in turn, national security. 10 2 The Fifth
92. See id.
93. See id. at 678 ("An agreement to arbitrate under the FAA is effectively a forum selection
clause ... not a waiver of substantive statutory protections and benefits.").
94. See id. at 679.
95. See id. (pointing to precedent emphasizing the primacy of the text "because only the text
of the law has been passed by Congress, not the often-contrived history.").
96. Id.
97. See id. at 680.
98. See id
99. See id.
100. See id. at 681 (emphasizing that the arbitration would include "procedures for discovery,
subpoenas, and presentation of evidence, to be followed by a written award from the Arbitrator.").
101. See id.
102. See id. ("Although we agree that the interests USERRA protects are important, it is wrong
to infer that the servicemembers' substantive rights are not fairly and adequately protected by
arbitration proceedings under the FAA.").
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Circuit stated that the "enforcement of employment arbitration agreements
does not disserve or impair the protections guaranteed by USERRA."'' 3 To
support this conclusion, the court likened the USERRA to statutes such as
the "Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the
Securities Act of 1933," all of which are subject to arbitration under
Supreme Court precedent.
0 4
B. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC
The next federal appellate court to address this issue was the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Landis v. Pinnacle Eye
Care, LLC,' °5 Landis had worked as an optometrist for the defendant since
1995.106 At the beginning of his employment, Landis signed an employment
agreement which contained a provision to arbitrate any controversy, dispute,
or disagreement relating to his employment.'0 7 In 1999, Landis signed an
identical employment agreement containing the same arbitration clause. 0 8
In April 2004, he was deployed to Afghanistan due to his membership in the
Indiana National Guard.'0 9 Landis claimed that prior to his deployment
overseas he had negotiated that his patients were to be cared for by
additional optometrists hired by the defendant."0 He alleged that upon his
return, his employer did not honor these terms, demoted him, and threatened
that if he continued his involvement with the military, his employment
would be at risk."' Landis filed a USERRA claim in district court alleging
employment discrimination based on his military service. 12 The district
court granted the employer's motion to stay and held that USERRA did not
preempt the arbitration clause of Landis's employment agreement.
Accordingly, the district court ordered the matter to arbitration." 3
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
105. 537 F.3d 559 (2008).
106. See id. at 560.
107. See id. There was no issue as to the validity of the arbitration agreement.
108. See id
109. See id.
110. Seeid. at 560-61.
111. See id at 561.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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Landis appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which framed the issue as whether
the dispute was arbitrable.' 4  First, the court affirmed the district court's
finding that Landis' claims were subject to the arbitration clause of his
employment agreement." 5 Next, the Sixth Circuit turned to the arbitrability
of USERRA claims in general.' 6 After noting that the Supreme Court has
allowed for the arbitration of other statutory claims, the court went on to
adopt the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Garrett completely." 7  The Sixth
Circuit favorably cited Garrett's reasoning in determining that: (1)
USERRA lacked Congressional intent to preclude arbitration; (2) the
legislative history of USERRA does not prevent the arbitration of claims
brought under it; and (3) "there is no inherent conflict between arbitration
and USERRA's underlying structure and purposes. '' 18
The Sixth Circuit recognized the lack of consensus among the district
courts of the remaining circuits, but refused to follow those cases that found
the USERRA prohibited arbitration." 9 This was because the court found
"no ambiguity in the text of USERRA regarding preemption of arbitration
agreements.' 20  Additionally, it faulted a district court opinion that had
defined arbitration as a "prerequisite" to the application of substantive rights
in contravention of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer."'2 The Garrett
decision was deemed proper persuasive authority, and the court therefore
held USERRA claims to be arbitrable.
22
Judge R. Guy Cole delivered a separate concurring opinion.
123
Although agreeing with the majority's outcome, he admitted it was a "close
case." 24 Judge Cole "[wrote] separately only to acknowledge the odd result
this holding produces and to encourage Congress, when the issue comes up
again, to be a bit more clear.' 2 5 Examining the language of § 4302(b) of the
114. See id.
115. See id
116. See id.
117. See id at 561-62. In an act of extraordinary deference, the Sixth Circuit directly quotes
large blocks of Garrett in its decision, essentially crediting the Fifth Circuit for its reasoning. See id.
118. Id. at 562-63.
119. Seeid at563.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id With this decision, the only two circuit courts to address the issue had now
determined that the national policy favoring arbitration trumped the ability of returning
servicemembers to litigate their employment claims in federal court. See id
123. See id at 564 (Cole, J., concurring).
124. Id. Judge Cole, while admitting the conflict he felt in making his decision, in the end also
reaches a conclusion rooted in the text of the USERRA at the expense of any additional interpretive
aids.
125. Id.
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USERRA, Judge Cole pondered over its use of the phrase "additional
prerequisites" in the list of items that USERRA supersedes. 2 6 He found that
it was only meant to prohibit requiring arbitration as a prerequisite to filing a
USERRA claim in federal court. 127  Thus, it would be appropriate for an
employee to completely waive his right to sue in federal court, but
inappropriate for the same employee to enter into an employment agreement
that compels arbitration prior to the filing of a USERRA claim in federal
court. 28 Finding that such a result would be "incongruous[," Judge Cole
criticizes the poor drafting of this section. 29 He avers that:
Congress may not have intended members of our armed forces to submit to binding,
coercive arbitration-indeed, I think quite the opposite-but nothing in the text of the
USERRA, or its legislative history, evinces a clear intent to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue."130
Finally, Judge Cole admonishes Congress to use "language that is
unmistakably clear" if it intends to prohibit arbitration, because of the reality
that an ever-increasing number of employers are including arbitration
provisions as boilerplate in their employment contracts.1
3
'
IV. THE PROPOSED SERVICEMEMBERS ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
On August 1, 2008, the proposed SAJA was introduced in the United
States Senate by Senator Robert Casey, Jr. of Pennsylvania, and co-
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and then-Senator
Barack Obama of Illinois.1 2 The bill, as currently written, would effectively
overturn Garrett and Landis. Specifically, § 3 of the SAJA is entitled
"Unenforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes Arising under
USERRA," and would add § 4327 to the USERRA.133  Section 4327(a) of
126. See id.
127. See id. A literal reading of the section could conceivably have such an absurd effect, but
Judge Cole does not attempt any alternative construction of the text.
128. See id. Judge Cole seems to ignore the logical intent behind the section by focusing on its
allegedly confounding prose.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 564-65. Judge Cole, though sympathetic to the petitioner's situation, does not
mention the interpretive maxim of Fishgold anywhere in his concurrence.
131. See id. at 565. As shall be discussed below, Judge Cole's admonition may prove to be
prophetic, although it arrived too late in the day to have influenced Congress directly.
132. See S. 3432, 110th Cong. §§ 1-9 (2008).
133. See § 3.
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the amended USERRA would provide, "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any clause of any agreement between an employer and an
employee that requires arbitration of a dispute under this chapter shall not be
enforceable. 134  Exceptions are allowed if both parties knowingly and
voluntarily agree to submit a USERRA claim to arbitration after the dispute
arises and if § 4 32 7(a) would interfere with any rights granted through a
valid collective bargaining agreement. 35  The SAJA also makes
unequivocally clear that the validity or enforceability of any agreement to
arbitrate shall be determined by a court, and not an arbitrator.1 36 In keeping
with the strong pro-plaintiff posture of the USERRA, the provisions of the
SAJA are retroactive and "shall apply with respect to all contracts and
agreements between an employer and an employee in force before, on, or
after the date of the enactment of this section."' 37 Furthermore, as currently
written, the SAJA shall apply to all USERRA actions or complaints pending
on or after the date of its enactment.1 3
8
Beyond the provision precluding arbitration, the SAJA would also allow
for: (1) individuals to bring USERRA claims against certain state
government employers in either state or federal Court; 139 (2) enhanced
remedies for USERRA plaintiffs, such as minimum liquidated damages for
willful violations and punitive damages for violations committed with
malice; 140 (3) mandatory attorney fee awards for successful USERRA
plaintiffs; 141 and (4) easier injunctive relief to prevent firings and make
employers reemploy returning veterans quickly.142 In addition, the SAJA
134. Id. This language would seem to fit the "unmistakably clear" standard that Judge Cole
asked for in his Landis concurrence. See Landis, 537 F.3d at 565.
135. See § 3. Such a section would permit a veteran to submit to binding arbitration only after
he or she is fully aware of the consequences of such a decision. See id
136. See id This illustrates that, whether based in fact or not, many plaintiffs find a judge to be
a more impartial decision-maker than an arbitrator. See, e.g., Matthew T. Ballenger, The Price of
Justice: The Role of Cost Allocation in the Employment Arbitration Fairness Analysis, 18 LAB.
LAW. 485, 497 (2003) (contrasting the very strict guidelines for judicial bias with the more nebulous
and inconsistent standards applied to arbitrators).
137. § 3. This clear, concise language should ease all doubt as to the SAJA's applicability. See
id. The retroactive nature should be especially comforting to those veterans who may have withheld
bringing USERRA claims for fear of being thwarted by the adverse precedents of Garrett and
Landis.
138. See id While it is too late for the plaintiffs in Landis and Garrett, the SAJA will prove
invaluable to the multitude of Reserves and National Guard who attempt to return to civilian life
after their tour of duty.
139. See§2.
140. See§4.
141. See§5.
142. See§9.
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clarifies that the USERRA has no statute of limitations, 143 that it prohibits
wage discrimination against service members,' 44 and adds a definition for
"successor in interest. 1 45
During the introduction of the bill, its Democratic sponsors urged its
passage.'4  "Our brave men and women serving our country already
sacrifice time away from their families, jobs and their lives. The least we
can do is help ensure that when they return their jobs will be waiting for
them," said Senator Casey. 47  Senator Obama remarked that, "[o]ur
returning service members and veterans should not have to fight another
battle at home for the benefits and rights they deserve.' 48  Both senators
noted that the SAJA was the least the United States Government could do
for the men and women who had answered the call to service.
49
On September 27, 2008, an identical SAJA bill was introduced in the
United States House of Representatives by Representatives Artur Davis of
Alabama, Jason Altmire of Pennsylvania, and Timothy Walz of
Minnesota. 150  Congressman Davis, who had introduced a similar bill in
2007, hailed the SAJA.' 51 "The Servicemembers Access to Justice Act will
ensure that our servicemembers are not treated as second-class citizens when
they seek to protect their civilian jobs and benefits as the law requires,"
Davis said. 52 Representative Altmire similarly thanked the three senators
for "moving us one step closer to ensuring America's heroes have the
support they deserve when they return home."'
' 53
143. See § 7.
144. See§8.
145. See§ 6.
146. See Press Release, Senator Robert E. Casey, Jr., Casey, Kennedy, Obama Introduce Bill to
Help Servicemembers and Veterans Keep Their Jobs (Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://casey.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=4a64c2c0-3750-4d 1 c-b608-82b68bcc8da9.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id
150. See H.R. 7178, 110th Cong. §§ 1-9 (2008).
151. See Press Release, Congressman Artur Davis, Congressman Davis Applauds Senators for
Their Fight to Protect Veterans' Jobs at Home (Aug. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/a107_davis/rajasaja.html.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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IV. COMMENT
The SAJA is a welcome piece of legislation that, if passed, would
effectively overturn the narrowly-reasoned Garrett and Landis decisions and
restore the overarching congressional intent behind the USERRA: to protect
the employment rights of members of the uniformed services. The United
States has a moral obligation to repay its veterans for their service, and the
SAJA is keeping in line with a long history of legislation benefiting veterans
exclusively. 15 4  The United States Department of Veterans Affairs has
provided for a host of benefits to servicemembers, such as lifetime pensions
for disabled veterans, affordable healthcare, and low-cost life insurance.'55
The 1944 Serviceman's Readjustment Act,'56 or G.I. Bill of Rights, and its
successor statutes have provided generous educational benefits for
successive generations of veterans. 157 The Veterans' Preference Act and its
successor statutes required the federal govemment to favor military veterans
when filling employment vacancies.'15  Immigration law allows military
personnel to take advantage of an expedited naturalization process to gain
United States citizenship. 5 9 Such laws, as well as the USERRA and its
154. See S. 3432, 110th Cong. §§ 1-3(2008).
155. See Department of Veterans Affairs, VA History in Brief,
http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/feature/history/docs/histbrf.pdf. The United States Department of Veterans
Affairs is the second largest federal agency after the Department of Defense. See id It was created
in 1930 to oversee all government programs concerning veterans and was elevated to a cabinet level
department in 1988 under President Ronald Reagan. See id.; Department of Veterans Affairs Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988).
156. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944).
157. The G.I. Bill provided generous educational benefits for veterans, a job counseling and
work placement program, as well as a guaranteed loan program for small businesses to stimulate
entrepreneurship among veterans. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346,
58 Stat. 284, at 287-93. Numerous successor statutes have also been deemed "G.I. Bills." See, e.g.,
Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 230 (the Korean G.I.
Bill).
158. See Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387 (1944) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). For an incisive survey and examination of veterans'
preference statutes, please see Brian Torresi, Comment, Operation Rewarding Sacrifice: A Proposal
to Amend the Definition of "Veteran" in Title 5 to Fully Effectuate the Purposes of Veterans'
Preference, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 209, 211-22 (2005).
159. See 8. U.S.C. § 1439 (2008). In recent years Congress has greatly eased naturalization
requirements for military servicemembers, so that they need only serve one year before becoming
eligible for naturalization. See § 1439(a). This law also allowed National Guard and Reserve
members to be eligible for naturalization after one year. See § 1440(a). Military applicants are no
longer charged fees in the naturalization process.See § 1439(b)(4). In contrast, persons not in the
military must generally meet a five year residency requirement before becoming eligible for
naturalization. See § 1427(a). For an enlightening review of the past and present role of the
immigrant in the U.S. Armed Services, please see Craig R. Shagin, Deporting Private Ryan: The
346
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predecessor statutes discussed supra, indicate a strong tradition of Congress
passing legislation providing benefits unique to the service member. 60 This
legislative tradition, as well as the Supreme Court's maxim of liberal
construction of veteran's employment statutes, demonstrates that the
USERRA should never have been placed on the same footing as other
federal laws, or even other antidiscrimination statutes, that have been
permitted to proceed through arbitration under the FAA.161
The practice of binding mandatory arbitration agreements has come
under intense criticism in recent years. 162 A controversial 2007 report by the
consumer advocacy group Public Citizen found that the use of binding
mandatory arbitration in credit card agreements very much disadvantaged
the consumer, as such arbitrations featured biased decision-makers, lacked
due process safeguards, and were shrouded in secrecy. 163  Indeed, in his
concurrence in Landis, Judge Cole admitted that courts had "moved beyond
the yesteryears of skepticism, mistrust, and even hostility toward arbitration
agreements[,]"' 64 yet he intimated that he believed Congress never intended
for USERRA claims to be submitted to "binding, coercive arbitration[.]', 165
Judge Cole's dicta bears resemblance to one commentator's criticism of the
reasoning behind Garrett, writing that submission to binding, coercive
arbitration agreements is most certainly not what the drafters of the
USERRA intended as they strove to formulate protections for the uniformed
Less than Honorable Condition of the Noncitizen in the United States Armed Forces, 17 WIDENER L.
REV. 245 (2007).
160. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. The legislative history indicates the
Congressional intent that the USERRA be "broadly construed and strictly enforced[.]" H.R. Rep.
No. 103-65, at 23 (1993).
162. See Feingold, supra note 12, at 298 ("[I]t is time for a broader prohibition of mandatory,
binding arbitration in settings where bargaining power is inherently unequal, or at least unequal in
almost all cases. Congress should consider whether it should ban mandatory, binding arbitration
agreements from all consumer and employment settings.").
163. See generally JOHN O'DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT
CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007). The report stated that "in a sample of nearly
19,300 California cases decided by one arbitration firm, consumers prevailed in 4 percent of the
cases, while companies prevailed in 94 percent." Id. at 4. Public Citizen's report has been met with
vociferous criticism from certain quarters. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The
Current State of Consumer Arbitration, DiSP. RESOL. MAC., Fall 2008, at 30, 31-34 (2008)
(rebutting Public Citizen's conclusions with several other studies showing that the net result of
consumer arbitration is a positive one).
164. Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 565 (2008).
165. Id. at 564.
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services. 166 It is disheartening that Judge Cole chose to ignore his instinct
that Congress did not intend to allow for the arbitration of USERRA claims.
The reasoning behind Garrett and Landis majorities represents the flaws
of applying a myopic "textualist" reading to statutes in that they reached a
result that was harmful to the very class the USERRA had been intended to
protect: uniformed service members. 6 7 In her construction of USERRA in
Garrett, Judge Jones followed a conservative line of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that places primacy in the text of any given statute, at the
expense of legislative history and agency regulations.'6 8 By focusing on the
Supreme Court's body of FAA case law, the Fifth Circuit curiously omitted
any discussion of the Supreme Court's long-standing maxim calling for the
liberal construction of veteran's benefits statutes in favor of the veteran.1
69
Indeed, by viewing the facts of the case through the narrow prism of the
FAA, the Fifth Circuit chose not to rely on the Supreme Court jurisprudence
on veteran's benefits, which would have provided a powerful counterweight
to the majority's reasoning.17 0 While the Supreme Court has allowed for the
arbitration of antidiscrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and Title VII, the classes of persons protected by these
statutes, such as the elderly or members of a certain sex or race, are much
broader than the specific class of service members protected by the
USERRA. 17' RICO and securities claims can also be readily distinguished
166. See id. at 564-65.
167. See Jonathon T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2006), for
a discussion of the merits and pitfalls of a textualist approach to statutory construction. The author
comments that modem textualism has veered into a dogmatic corridor, and that "by rushing to find
clarity and thereby excluding consideration of statutory purposes, aggressive textualism may
undermine one of textualism's principal benefits-its purported ability to cabin judicial discretion,
thereby rendering judges more faithful to the laws actually enacted by Congress, and less likely to
impose their own policy preferences." Id. at 50.
168. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("[I]t is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed."); W. Va. Univ, Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best evidence
of... purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the
President."). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 843-44 (1991) (arguing against the use of
legislative history because "continuous and constant referral to legislative history tends to engage the
Court in the interpretation of texts-committee reports or the utterances of various senators and
representatives-that have never been enacted by both Houses of Congress or presented to the
President.").
169. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 285 (1946).
170. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text,
171. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2008) (creating laws to protect employees from
discrimination based on age) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e1-17 (2008) (creating laws to protect
employees from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) with 38 U.S.C.
348
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for USERRA claims, as the former are statutes of general applicability,
while the latter are available only to qualified service members.1
2
In its adoption of Garrett's reasoning to reach its holding, Landis
essentially permitted a close reading of the letter of the law to obfuscate the
spirit of the law.173  Judge Cole, to his credit, at least acknowledged the
unsavory result such a close reading would produce: a constriction of the
service member's right to fully litigate his or her USERRA claim. 174 After
Garrett was handed down, Captain Samuel F. Wright, one of the USERRA's
original drafters, harshly criticized its result, stating that "this 5th Circuit
decision, if allowed to stand, could gut the effective enforcement of
USERRA."' 17 5  Several other commentators have criticized the reasoning
behind Garrett.176  In a more recent article, Captain Wright referred to
Landis as a "major setback" in the effort to reverse Garrett, concluding that
"[i]f we are to overturn Garrett, it is likely to be through a statutory
amendment, not case law development." '7 7
Through the introduction of the SAJA, the Senate has, unconsciously,
answered Judge Cole's call for clearer language on the issue of the
arbitrability of USERRA claims. The unequivocal language of § 3 of the
proposed amendment would leave no room for future courts to construe the
USERRA is a way which favors the defendant employer. 7 ' Arbitration is
still available should the plaintiff choose that route, but the decision shall be
up to the veteran, and only after the claim has arisen.' 79 The SAJA will do
away with the prospective waiver of one's right to a judicial forum endorsed
by Garrett and Landis.
§§ 4301-4333 (2008) (creating laws to protect persons from discrimination based on their service in
the armed forces).
172. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2008) (permitting a private civil cause of action under
RICO by any person harmed by the acts of a racketeer).
173. See Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561-63 (2008).
174. See id. at 564-65 (Cole, J., concurring).
175. Captain Samuel F. Wright, Mandatory Arbitration Mandate: Court Ruling Sets Back
USERRA Enforcement, July/Aug. 2006,
http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=law-review 0619 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
176. See Erwin, supra note 48, at 12; Laura Bettenhausen, Note, The FAA and the USERRA:
Pro-Arbitration Policies Can Undermine Federal Protection of Military Personnel, 2007 J. DISP.
RESOL. 267,281-82 (2007) (commenting that the Fifth Circuit in Garrett did not adhere "to the main
purpose of the USERRA: to protect the employment rights of members of the armed forces.").
177. Captain Samuel F. Wright, Proposed Servicemembers Access to Justice Act, Oct. 2008,
http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lawreview_0847 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
178. See S. 3432, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008).
179. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
This law could not have been introduced at a more crucial time. The
Iraq conflict is expected to continue for some time into the Obarna
presidency, and the Afghanistan war is planned to escalate exponentially. 80
The number of USERRA actions is therefore not likely to abate. The
likelihood of the SAJA's passage is high for several reasons, not the least of
which is that one of its co-sponsors has been elected President of the United
States.' 8' Senator Kennedy is perhaps one of the most influential and
successful members of either house and his involvement with the SAJA
bodes well for its success. Finally, both the House and Senate bills are
sponsored by Democrats, who have gained a substantial congressional
majority in the 2008 elections. There are thus few foreseeable obstacles
preventing the swift passage of SAJA, other than, perhaps, the glut of
economic legislation that is planned for 2009. The men and women who put
their lives and careers on the line to serve their nation deserve unrestricted
access to that nation's federal courts. The SAJA is a sensible piece of
legislation that, rather than overreaching, merely restores the original intent
behind the passage of the USERRA.
180. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
181. See Adam Nagoumey, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008, at Al.
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